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Abstract 
 In recent years, serious concerns have been raised against the tampering of integrated circuits 
due to outsourcing of circuits for fabrication. It has led to the addition of malicious circuitry known as 
Hardware Trojan. In this paper, a transition probability based node reduction technique for faster and 
efficient Hardware Trojan (HT) detection has been attempted. In the proposed method, the fact that the 
least controllab le and observable nodes or the nodes with least transition probability are more vulnerable 
as Trojan sites is taken into consideration. The nodes that have lesser activity than the threshold are the 
candidate nodes. At each candidate node, segmentation is done for further leakage power analysis to 
detect the presence of Trojans. Experimental results observed on ISCAS’85 and ISCAS’89 benchmark 
circuits illustrate that the proposed work can achieve remarkable node reduction upto 78.81% and time 
reduction upto 58.7%. It was also observed that the circuit activity can be increased by varying the input 
probability. Hence, for further reduction in the Trojan activation time, the weighted input probability was 
obtained. 
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1. Introduction 
The increase in the complexity of the modern electronics has led to an increase in the 
involvement of various firms from around the globe in each phase of the electronics supply 
chain. Outsourcing has increased the integrated circuit vulnerability to various malicious 
activities and alterations. These modifications termed as Hardware Trojan(HT) has raised 
genuine concerns with respect to conceivable dangers to military frameworks, budgetary 
foundations, transportation security, and healthcare appliances. HTs when introduced in a 
system, may affect the life span of the system, change the functionality or system specification, 
leak confidential information or led to denial of service [1-4].  
Detection of such malicious alterations is extremely difficult, due to many reasons. To 
start with, given the vast number of soft, firm, and hard IP centers utilized as a part of SoCs, and 
in addition the high multifaceted nature of today's IP blocks, distinguishing a little malignant 
change is extremely difficult. Second, Trojan circuits, by configuration, are normally initiated 
under certain conditions, which make them inactive and hard to be recognized utilizing random 
or functional stimuli. Third, tests used to identify fabricating shortcomings, for example, stuck -at 
and delay faults can not ensure detection of Trojans [5]. Considering these facts, detection of 
Trojans utilizing basic investigation would be ineffective. 
An efficient method to accelerate the HT detection is the need of the hour and the same 
has been proposed in this work. The method is based on the generation of weighted input 
patterns to facilitate the activation of the HTs. Moreover, transition probability analysis node 
reduction has been attempted in the circuit for faster detection of HTs the fact that the least 
controllable and observable nodes or the nodes with least transition probability are perfect 
trigger nodes for adding Trojans. Hence by considering only these nodes, the Trojan detection 
process can be accelerated with the same efficiency as the case wherein all the nodes are 
under observation. For weighted input pattern generation, an iterative procedure is followed 
such that the transition probability at each node should be equal to or greater than the user-
defined threshold. The main contributions of this paper can be listed as follows: 
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a. Generation of weighted input probability set, which reduces Trojan activation time. 
b. Efficient and high speed Trojan detection technique by reducing the nodes of 
observation. 
c. Validation of the effectiveness of Transition probability based Node reduction technique 
through extensive circuit-level simulations and by comparing it to the approach without 
node reduction. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, briefs about hardware 
trojans and their basic classification.  In Section III, the basic idea of the proposed approach is 
explained including the weighted input pattern generation algorithm and detection algorithm is 
discussed in detail in Section IV. Section V shows the simulation results using the proposed 
method, and finally Section VI concludes this paper. 
 
 
2. Motivation 
Design methodologies can assist Trojan detection by employing various testing 
techniques. Since an adversary always prefers to use rare internal node conditions to develop a 
Trojan, an approach that increases the node activity can facilitate in improving Trojan detection 
coverage. An often used strategy is to exercise all functions with critical patterns, instead of the 
simulation of thorough set of patterns which can be expensive. However, the definition of crucial 
patterns usually depends on the designer’s heuristics [6]. In this paper, the input stimuli is 
selected in such a way that it increases the transition probability of all the nodes. By increasing 
the transition probability, it is expected that in case of presence of Trojan, its activation time will 
decrease and its effect can be seen during the detection phase. Hence, weighted input 
probability is generated so as to achieve this condition [7]. 
For faster and accurate response analysis, observation of internal signals of a circuit 
becomes necessary. Controllability, observability and transition probability at each node are few 
methods used for observing internal signals [8]. Controllability  for  a  digital  circuit  is outlined  
as the problem of setting a selected logic signal to 0 or 1. Observability for a digital circuit  is the  
measure of observing  the  state  of a  logic  signal [8,9]. The  controllability  and  observability  
measures are helpful as they quantify the difficulty in setting and observing internal signals of a 
circuit [10,11]. Probability defines the risk of obtaining logic 0 or logic 1 on any node of the given 
circuit. High probability suggests a high circuit activity at that node. The main advantage of 
those techniques is that they involve topological analysis, however no test vectors [12]. These 
are static sort of analysis and that they have linear quality, this technique succeeds if the input 
test stimuli improves the corresponding node activity. Improving the circuit activity increases the 
triggering action and hence increases the chances of observing variations at the output. 
Goldenchip free HT detection was discussed in [13], in which power metric based HT detection 
and diagnosis is done without referring to any reference chip. This nullifies the effect of process 
variation and the reduced power measurements. 
 
 
3. Proposed Work 
Hardware Trojan detection relies on a threat model that explains a specific Trojan 
activity within the circuit. Payload is the circuit stricken by the Trojan and trigger initiates the 
unwanted change in the circuit activity. The inputs to the trigger is the original nodes with low 
circuit activity. Therefore, this is the basis of the algorithm formulated. The rarely triggered 
nodes are targeted and the weighted input probability list is generated which increases the 
activity at these nodes. Figure 1 gives the brief idea of how Trojan detection is carried out in this 
work. 
 
3.1. Generation of Weighted Input Probability List 
For activation of Trojans, the transition probability at each node should be increased. 
Transition probability threshold (𝑇𝑃𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑) is determined as a tradeoff between speed and 
efficiency of the detection algorithm. In order to enhance the circuit activity of candidate node n, 
whose value is more than 𝑇𝑃𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑, the distinction between its signal chance being 1 and 0 
needs to be reduced, so as to realize this, the input probability of the first input that 
encompasses a higher influence on the circuit activity of the candidate node will be increased. 
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Figure 1. Transition Probability Based Node Reduction Technique 
 
 
Consider the circuit in Figure 2(a), with 0.5 as the input probability, the transition 
probability for all the nodes is calculated using the formulae from Table 1. At node o[2], the 
transition probability obtained is 0.234. To increase this value, the transition probability of the 
corresponding primary input i.e a[2] is increased to 0.7, which results to 0.249 as the increased 
transition probability of node o[2]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2(a). c17 ISCAS’85 Benchmark circuit 
with Initial Transition probability 
Figure 2(b). c17 ISCAS’85 Benchmark circuit 
with Reduced Transition probability 
 
 
Table 1. Formulae for Evaluating Transition Probability of Basic Logic Gates 
Logic Gate Transition Probability (TP = P 0 x P1) 
AND (1-PAPB) x (PAPB) 
OR (1-PA)(1-PB) x (1-(1-PA)(1-PB)) 
NOT (1-PA) x PA 
NAND (PAPB)(1-PAPB) 
NOR (1-(1-PA)(1-PB)) x (1-PA)(1-PB) 
XOR (1-(PA+PB-2PAPB)) x (PA+PB-2PAPB) 
 
 
Consider the ISCAS’85 benchmark circuit c1355, it has 41 primary inputs, 32 primary 
outputs and total number of gates is 546.  When the input transition probability is 0.5, the 
minimum circuit activity is noted as 0.0025. After iteratively increasing the probability list, such 
that the minimum circuit activity is greater than or equal to the threshold value, it is observed 
that the minimum circuit activity can be increased to 0.006 without the need of extra hardware. 
This shows that the circuit activity can be increased upto 63.42%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1 : Levelization of the test circuit. 
Step 2 : Transition probability calculation at each node. 
Step 3 : Determination of minimum transition probability when input probability is 0.5. 
Step 4 : Determination of maximum value to which transition probability can be 
increased hence resulting in weighted input probability list. 
Step 5 : Calculation of optimum transition probability which can be used as threshold 
value. 
Step 6 : Acquiring rarely triggered nodes. 
Step 7 : Segmentation of the circuit taking radius equal to 1. 
Step 8 : Equation formulation and solving based on the leakage power analysis of the 
segments obtained. 
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Step 1: Computing weighted input probability list such that all the nodes have transition 
probability greater than 𝑇𝑃𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Node Reduction Algorithm for Trojan Detection 
Step 2: Using the rarely triggered nodes, the presence of Trojan will be detected 
 
 
 
 
 
In this work, the transition probability at each node is considered for identifying the least 
controllable and observable nodes i.e. rarely triggered nodes. The rarely triggered nodes come 
further in use while segmentation is done. Segmentation is implemented around the nodes 
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identified as rarely triggering nodes in the circuit [14]. Further for Trojan detection, power 
analysis is considered wherein the presence of Trojan will show a considerable difference in the 
leakage power. 
During segmentation, the rarely triggered node is considered as the centre and then by 
taking radius as 1, i.e. one logic gate, segments are created and the common gate which has 
the rarely triggered node as input is considered as the overlapping gate. Figure 3 is used to 
illustrate the above segmentation procedure wherein the Trojan present at the rarely triggered 
node will be included in the segment as shown. A change in coefficients is seen in the equations 
which are formulated based on the input stimuli given to the segment under observation. The 
coefficients are predetermined as it only depends on the gate and the input given to the gate. 
The output value of each equation is the overall leakage power of the segment for the 
corresponding input stimuli. The characterization of a single gate overlapping in multiple 
segments helps to observe change in variable ouput due to presence of malicious circuitry. In 
each round of the diagnosis, multiple segments based on number of inputs to the gate with 
rarely triggered node as the overlapping gate is characterized. Then, the values are tallied for 
various segments. The one that features a considerable distinction compared to the other 
values is assumed to be infected [15]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Segmentation Around the Rarely Triggered Node 
 
 
4. Simulation Results 
For various benchmark circuits with different number of controllable nodes, by changing 
the transitional probability threshold, the rarely triggered nodes are obtained for each case. It is 
observed that if the threshold is too low then many critical nodes are not considered therefore 
reducing the system efficiency but the system speed increases whereas if the threshold is very 
high then nodes under observation increases which increases system efficiency but system 
speed decreases. Hence, selection of transition probability is a tradeoff between efficiency and 
speed of the system. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Number of Critical Nodes that Need to be Considered for Varying 𝑇𝑃𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
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The proposed method aims to detect malicious circuitry at the gate-level wherin the 
malicious circuitry is added to the netlist by the adversary. In order to validate the proposed 
methodology, the ISCAS’85 and ISCAS’89 benchmarks are chosen, in which HT attacks based 
on addition of malicious circuitry is targetted. 
 
 
Table 1. Transition Probability Based Node Reduction Technique Implemented on ISCAS’85 
Benchmark circuit 
Circuit # Inputs 
Without Reduction With Reduction % Node 
Reduction 
% Time 
Reduction # Nodes Time (ms) # Nodes Time (ms) 
c432 36 153 24.742 42 16.173 72.549 34.633 
c499 41 170 21.288 48 13.996 71.764 34.254 
c1355 41 514 53.569 112 19.165 78.210 64.224 
c1980 33 855 37.517 119 19.491 86.082 48.047 
c2670 233 1129 68.059 165 26.597 85.385 60.921 
c3540 50 1647 57.449 465 29.021 71.767 49.484 
c5315 178 2184 122.865 246 35.488 88.736 71.116 
c6288 32 2384 173.861 31 27.485 98.699 84.191 
c7552 207 3405 230.432 348 42.982 89.779 81.346 
      82.553 58.691 
 
 
Table 2. Transition Probability Based Node Reduction Technique implemented on ISCAS’89 
Benchmark Circuit 
Circuit # Inputs 
Without Reduction With Reduction % Node 
Reduction 
% Time 
Reduction # Nodes Time (ms) # Nodes Time (ms) 
s298 32 99 38.695 9 16.595 99.909 57.113 
s386 20 146 43.766 59 24.269 59.589 44.548 
s444 46 154 47.451 25 25.089 83.766 47.126 
s526 46 166 50.407 30 29.533 81.928 41.411 
s641 73 337 75.173 53 31.205 84.273 58.489 
s713 74 351 75.776 41 30.214 88.319 60.127 
s838 29 265 66.799 79 34.862 70.189 47.810 
s953 52 366 81.411 249 52.691 31.967 35.277 
s1488 20 628 111.211 170 47.176 72.929 57.579 
s5378 379 2566 202.383 660 69.493 74.279 65.663 
s9234 459 5347 446.241 1208 80.376 77.408 81.988 
s15850 1132 9102 787.497 1731 107.568 80.982 86.341 
s38584 2737 17677 1026.631 3664 364.775 79.272 64.468 
      75.062 57.534 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this work, a faster and efficient solution of HT detection using node reduction 
technique is developed. It employs segmentation around the nodes with transition probability 
less than the user-defined threshold. It was concluded that while selecting the user-defined 
threshold, the transition probability should be set such that it is neither too high nor too low 
because high transition probability will increase the number of segments which is again time 
consuming whereas low transition probability will decrease the efficiency of the system due to 
the non-consideration of some of the critical nodes. The weighted input pattern obtained was 
used for faster Trojan activation as it increased the transition probability at each node to a value 
which is higher than or equal to the user-defined threshold. The proposed method was 
implemented on ISCAS’85 and ISCAS’89 benchmark circuits and it was observed that it can 
achieve remarkable node reduction upto 82.55% and 75.06% respectively, and time reduction 
upto 58.69% and 57.53% respectively. Hence the proposed technique gives faster and efficient 
way of Trojan detection. 
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